This paper uses the British Household Panel Survey to present the first estimates of the housework-wage relationship in Britain. Controlling for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, we find that housework has a negative impact on the wages of men and women, both married and single, who work full-time. Among women working parttime, only single women suffer a housework penalty. The housework penalty is uniform across occupations within full-time jobs but some part-time jobs appear to be more compatible with housework than others. We find tentative evidence that the housework penalty is larger when there are children present.
Introduction
There is a growing empirical literature that investigates housework as a factor affecting wages in addition to conventional human capital and job characteristics (for a recent survey see Maani and Cruickshank, 2009 ). This paper contributes to this literature by documenting the effect of housework on wages for Britain, a country that has never been analysed before in this context. Using panel data to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity, we estimate the effect of housework on wages for single and married men and women. We find that housework lowers the wages of both men and women, especially those who are full-time workers, married, and have children.
Various theories have been put forward to explain why housework might affect wages. Becker (1985) first described a model in which a fixed amount of energy or effort has to be allocated amongst different activities. Housework activities are tiring and so reduce the amount of effort available for market work, resulting in lower productivity and wages. Bonke et al. (2005) presented a similar model but focussed on the timing and flexibility of housework. If housework has to be done at times of the day that interfere with market work (for instance by limiting the ability to stay for late meetings, for training courses, for travelling to and from work, or networking after work), overall productivity will be lower. Other theories focus more explicitly on labour market structure and job characteristics. Workers with high housework burdens may select into jobs with convenient hours or lighter working conditions, and these jobs may carry a negative compensating differential (see for example Hersch, 1991b, and 2009 ), or pay less because monopsonistic employers take account of workers' preferences for these jobs (Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel, 2007) .
In view of these different theories, we follow the traditional approach in the literature and estimate standard wage equations augmented by measures of housework. Our analysis is based on panel data from the British Household Panel Survey (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . The panel nature of the survey allows us to take into account individual permanent unobserved heterogeneity which may cause a spurious negative correlation between housework and wages. For example, individuals with more housework responsibilities may be less career oriented and thus earn lower wages because either they put less effort into their work (the so-called 'lack of interest' argument; Hersch, 2009 ), or because they are discriminated against by their employer. We perform an analysis that allows for the role of job characteristics and estimates separate effects by gender and marital status. This distinction is important given the gendered nature of housework and the fact that marriage is characterized by the presence of specialization and economies of scale that affect how much time individuals spend doing housework and also what housework activities they engage in (Gupta, 1999; Hersch and Stratton, 2002) . 1 Because work time and other timeuse arrangements are different between part-time and full-time workers, we also look at these groups in a separate way.
After controlling for permanent unobserved heterogeneity and for the usual wage determinants such as age and education, we find a negative housework effect on wages for all groups considered, except for married women working part-time. The wages of full-time workers decrease by about 0.25% per hour of weekly housework, implying that an extra ten hours of housework per week would lower wages by 2.5%. We cannot reject that the effects are the same across marital status and gender, and the impact appears to be linear in housework. Our findings confirm the negative effects of housework on women's wages generally found in US studies (Coverman, 1983; Hersch, 1985; Shelton and Firestone, 1988; Hersch, 1991a,b; Stratton, 1994, 1997; Hundley, 2000 Hundley, , 2001 Noonan, 2001; Stratton, 2001; Hersch and Stratton, 2002; Shirley and Wallace, 2004; Keith and Malone, 2005; Hersch, 2009) . A similar relationship has been found in Australia (McAllister, 1990) , in Canada (Phipps et al., 2001) , and in Denmark (Bonke et al., 2005) . To our knowledge there is only one previous study that has analysed housework and wages by marital status, as we do (Hersch and Stratton, 2002) . The authors also find a negative effect for both married and single individuals working full-time, with stronger effects among married women. In line with the small number of studies that have examined part-time workers separately (e.g., McAllister, 1990) , we find the effect for married part-time workers is lower.
Consistent with previous literature (Hersch, 2009) we also find that the effect of housework is constant within occupations for full-time workers, suggesting that the negative effect of housework on wages cannot be explained by differing levels of required effort or other work conditions that make housework difficult to combine with certain jobs. We also fail to find differential effects for workers with flexible work schedules. Occupation seems to play a role for single women working part time, however, suggesting that these women may end up in jobs with less convenient schedules. The negative housework-wage relation appears whether or not there are children in the household, although we do find some evidence that housework has a larger effect on the wages of married women with children, so having children seems to worsen the trade-off between housework and market work for this group of women.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical strategy, Section 3 describes the BHPS, Section 4 shows that housework has a negative effect on wages for most groups, and especially for married women working full time. Section 5 presents some robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
Empirical strategy

General specification: housework and wages
Following the standard approach in the literature, our analysis is based on the following wage equation augmented by measures of housework:
where w it is the log of the real gross hourly wage of individual i measured at time t, x it is a vector of characteristics assumed to affect wages, pt it is an indicator variable for part-time work (30 hours or less per week), and h it is the number of hours of housework per week. The error term consists of an individual effect i representing unmeasured characteristics that do not vary over time and a transitory component " it . The parameters of interest are 1 , which is the marginal effect of housework on wages for full-time workers holding constant other relevant characteristics; and 2 , the additional effect for part-timers. Because part and full-time workers have very different time allocations we include the part-time interaction to allow for different mechanisms in the housework-wage relationship.
To allow for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, we present results from fixed effects (FE) models. Controlling for permanent unobserved heterogeneity is important in this context because the permanent error in eq. (1) is likely to be correlated with housework, resulting in biased coefficients if OLS is used. For example, more career-oriented individuals are likely to earn more (have a high individual effect i in the wage equation) and also do less housework. In this case, i will be negatively correlated with housework, and the OLS estimate of 1 will be negatively biased.
We perform the analysis by gender and marital status throughout. 2 This distinction is important given the gendered nature of housework and the fact that marriage is associated with specialization in housework tasks (Gupta, 1999; Hersch and Stratton, 2002) . We define married as being married or cohabiting in the current period, thus individuals switch between the married and single samples when they change status (about 20% change status at some point in the panel).
The controls in eq.
(1) include human capital variables (educational qualifications and quadratics in age and job tenure), the number of children in the household, job characteristics such as trade union coverage and temporary contract status, and firm characteristics such as establishment size and industry.
Data and sample
We use data from the BHPS, which has followed a nationally representative sample of about 5,500 private households (containing about 10,000 individuals) since 1991. The survey aims to interview all adults (over 16 years old) from the original sample every year, as well as all other adult members of their current households (including newly formed households). Children in sample households become full sample members when they reach age 16. The BHPS contains rich information on household structure, socio-demographic characteristics, individuals' labour market experience and job characteristics. Since wave 2 it has asked respondents how long on average they spend on housework per week. Our sample comprises waves 2-14, corresponding to 1992 to 2004, and we restrict estimation to employees of working age (16-59 years for women and 16-64 years for men) who completed the full interview and gave valid information on all variables of interest. Our final sample contains 4533 men (observed over 5.8 waves on average) and 4592 women (5.7 waves).
As well as using age to proxy labour market experience, we also experiment with a measure of actual experience (total time spent in employment, including selfemployment) based on the retrospective BHPS data (see Maré, 2006) . Using actual experience allows us to control for the effects of past career interruptions, but unfortunately we lose observations for about 30% of the sample who do not give full information about their employment histories (irrespective of whether their true work histories are continuous or not). In the main regressions we use age as a control but test the robustness of the results to using actual experience.
In particular, we estimate the equation using the main sample and an indicator for missing values of experience. Results do not vary greatly between the two specifications.
The housework variable is the response to the question 'About how many hours do you spend on housework in an average week, such as time spent cooking, cleaning, and doing the laundry?' The hourly wage is derived from respondents' usual gross pay per month and their usual weekly working hours, and is indexed to 2004 prices.
3 Part-time status is constructed from the total number of usual weekly hours reported by workers, and defined as 30 hours or less. We also restrict the sample to those working more than five hours per week to alleviate problems of extreme measurement error. Table 1 presents summary statistics for housework and hourly wages for full-and part-time workers, broken down by gender and marital status. The means of the remaining variables used in the analysis are reported in Appendix Table A1 . Columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 show that there are considerable differences between men and women. Women undertake about 13 hours of housework per week compared to under five hours for men. The high level of housework among women is partly driven by the large amounts done by part-timers (18 hours per week), but even full-time working women put in ten hours per week of housework. The gap between men and women's housework is even larger among couples: fulltime married women do nearly 12 hours a week and part-time married women do over 19 hours, compared to only five hours for (full-time) married men (columns 5-6). While part-time married men do a little more housework (6.7 hours), parttime work is very uncommon among men (only 3.3% of the sample). There is hardly any increase in men's housework associated with marriage, while women's housework almost doubles (from eight to 15 hours). Overall, the figures in Table 1 underline the high share of housework done by women and the large increases in female housework associated with marriage, consistent with other studies such as Gupta (1999) and Hersch and Stratton (2002) . Table 1 also shows that the overall gender wage gap is about 25% (columns 1 and 2), falling to about 16% for full-timers. The gap is nearly 38% (0.32 log points) among married workers (columns 5 and 6), mirroring the large difference in housework between married men and women. In general, Table 1 shows that those earning lower wages do more housework. While these raw figures are suggestive of a negative relationship between housework and wages, we now turn to a multivariate analysis in order to control for the other determinants of wages, including permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Table 2 reports the estimates of the FE model given by eq. (1). The main coefficients of interest are those on housework and its interaction with part-time work. The housework coefficient shown in the first row of Columns 3 and 4 clearly shows that housework has a negative effect on the wages of married men and women working full time. All else equal, an extra hour of housework lowers a full-time married woman's wage by 0.28% and a married man's by 0.19%. Although the coefficients are less significant for single individuals working full time, the estimates have the same sign and order of magnitude as for married full-time workers, and the differences between the two groups are only significant at 10% or greater. 4 It is possible that the larger standard errors on the coefficients for single workers may in part be due to less variation over time in housework (the within-person variance is smaller for single than for married workers, especially for single women who have a within variance of 14.0 compared to 29.1 for married women).
Main results: the effect of housework on wages
Our FE results are consistent with studies in other countries for women, which find an average effect of housework on wages of -0.19% (Maani and Cruickshank, 2009) . We are only aware of one study, Hersch and Stratton (2002) for the US, which has specifically analysed single women. They also find that housework has a negative effect on single women's wages in an OLS specification (they were not able to obtain reliable FE estimates using their short panel). For men the balance of evidence from other countries is less clear. The effects of housework on men's Notes: (i) Controls also included are: dummy variables for region and year, one-digit industry, and establishment size; (ii) the dependent variable is the log of the real gross hourly wage; (iii) t-statistics in parentheses; (iv) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
m. bryan and a. sevilla-sanz 193 wages is typically smaller than the effect on women's wages (Maani and Cruickshank, 2009) , and for single men Hersch and Stratton (2002) find a marginally significant negative housework penalty using OLS. FE estimates of the housework coefficient for men are usually found to be negative but insignificant (Hersch and Stratton, 1997; Noonan, 2001) . Our estimate for married men (Table 2 ) is significant and smaller than the effect for married women, though the two are not significantly different.
Returning to the main estimates, the second row of Table 2 shows the interaction term between housework and part-time status. Columns 2 and 4 show an additional negative effect of housework on the wages of men working part-time, although the coefficients are not significant at 5% (possibly due to small cell sizes, since very few men work part-time). For women working part-time, whereas there seems to be no effect of housework on the wages of part-time married women, there is an extra negative effect of housework among part-time single women. Column 3 shows that the interaction of housework and part-time status carries a positive and highly significant coefficient for married women (+0.24%), which cancels out the negative main effect (the total effect is -0.04%, t = 1.0).
5 However the interaction coefficient for single women presented in Column 1 shows a negative effect of housework on wages that reinforces the main effect, so that the total effect for single women working part-time is -0.31%, t = 2.7. The difference between the interaction coefficients is indeed highly significant (t = 3.2).
Our results for married women working part-time are in line with the small number of studies that have examined part-time workers separately (e.g. McAllister, 1990 ). There are various possibilities for why the housework penalty may be smaller in part-time jobs. One reason may be that part-time workers have more time to rest and recuperate after doing the housework, even if they do more housework overall. (Table 1 shows indeed that part-timers also do much more housework: 19 hours per week for part-time married women compared to 12 hours for full-time married women.) Another possibility is that part time workers may have some choice over their hours and can choose work schedules that do not clash with their housework commitments, as suggested by McAllister (1990) . Neither hypothesis alone can however explain why there is a negative housework effect in part-time jobs done by single women and not by married women.
The BHPS data do not contain any information on when housework is performed (neither during the week, nor during the day), or the type of housework activities. The data are, however, very rich in other contextual information that can offer some indirect evidence in regards to the different magnitudes of the housework coefficient between single and married women working part-time. Table 3 lists selected characteristics of the jobs held by married and single part-time women. Here we see that married women working part-time are in higher quality jobs and are happier with their working hours. Compared to single women, married women working part-time are paid more, are less likely to be on a temporary contract, and are more likely to be unionized. They are also more likely to be in clerical occupations rather than in personal services or in the retail sector, where hours and work schedules may be more variable and unpredictable (see Presser, 2005) . Significantly, married women who work part-time are more satisfied with their jobs than single women and are much less likely to want longer hours of work (only 12% want more hours compared to 27% of single women). It is thus plausible that married part-timers select their jobs to fit in with housework commitments (and can perhaps be more choosy because there is a second income in the household), while single workers may have to take a part-time job out of necessity, filling in undesirable hours that are less compatible with housework activities. We come back to the association between work flexibility and housework below. The coefficients on the control variables in Table 2 generally have the expected signs. Wages follow an inverse-U shaped profile in age, there are positive returns to education, a positive premium to union coverage and a wage penalty associated with temporary work. Consistent with the family gap literature (see for example Waldfogel, 1998) , having children has a negative effect on a woman's wage (either single or married), and a positive effect on a man's wage. However, the negative effect of housework on wages still remains. Given that the association between having children and getting married has weakened in recent years, we explore the relationship between housework and wages according to parental status (in addition to marital status) in more depth below.
The part-time coefficients are positive, suggesting there is a premium rather than a penalty attached to part-time work. While a large body of work has found a parttime penalty using cross-sectional methods, some studies have reported positive coefficients on part-time work in longitudinal analysis (for example, see Manning and Petrongolo, 2005) . These authors note that a plausible explanation for the opposite sign in FE estimates is measurement error in the hours variable. To take an example, if a full-time worker just above the 30 hour threshold understates her working time by even a small amount, she will be misclassified as a part-timer. At the same time, her hourly wage will be overestimated (because reported hours are in the denominator), resulting in an upward bias to the part-time coefficient. FE results are particularly susceptible to this type of misclassification because the part-time coefficient is identified from transitions between full-time and part-time status, which are relatively infrequent (in our data, only 9% of women and 2% of men change between full-time and part-time from year to year). Cross-sectional methods should thus yield smaller (and probably negative) coefficients. We also estimate a pooled (OLS) version of the model and results are in line with crosssectional studies. We find a significant part-time penalty for women, while the parttime coefficient for men is insignificant 6 .
Non-linear effects of housework on wages
Given the large differences between the amounts of housework done by women (especially married women) and men, some studies have tested for non-linear or threshold effects in the housework-wage relation. Hersch and Stratton (1997) find some evidence of a wage penalty for women once housework exceeds ten hours per week, whereas the men's penalty is similar across the range of housework hours. Hersch (2009) also finds evidence of a threshold effect, and shows that the coefficient on housework becomes statistically significant for both men and women only after one hour of housework per day. To investigate non-linear effects in the BHPS sample we experiment with a quadratic specification and with splines that allow the coefficients to vary over different hours ranges. For full-time workers, the upper panel of Table 4 shows that a squared term in housework is not statistically significant. The lower panel presents the estimates using a spline with nodes at five and ten hours (approximately the mean housework levels for men and women). For full-time married women, the housework coefficients are only significant at more than five hours per week, however we cannot reject equality of all the coefficients (p = 0.72). For married men, only the coefficient for housework of less than five hours is significant, but again we cannot reject joint equality.
7 Overall, we find little evidence of threshold effects among full-time workers. Among the small minority of men working part-time, there is some evidence of convexity in the housework-wage relationship (the quadratic interaction term is positive and significant for married men). There is also a suggestion that the smaller negative effect of housework on the wages of part-time married women is concentrated above ten hours per week (although we cannot reject joint equality of the spline coefficients). But in general, housework seems to have a similar effect at all levels.
The role of occupation and flexibility
A possible mechanism for the negative effect on housework on wages reported in Tables 2 and 3 is that workers may sort into jobs that fit in with housework because they involve less effort or more convenient hours. Wages may be lower in these housework-compatible jobs because lower effort reduces productivity, or because convenient hours and amenable working conditions are costly to employers and lead to negative compensating differentials (Hersch, 1991b, and 2009) . 8 The results above already control for job characteristics such as firm size and industry, but in this section we further investigate the mechanism by which housework might affect wages by including additional characteristics (occupation and flexible working) which should capture some variation in effort requirements and working conditions. Following Hersch (2009), we also investigate the housework effect within occupations (and flexible versus non-flexible jobs), to see whether systematic differences across job types can provide some evidence for whether effort requirements or the amount of job flexibility may partly explain the negative houseworkwage relation.
The top panel of Table 5 shows the estimates when one-digit occupation dummies are added to the regressions. 9 Compared to our main results in Table 2 , inclusion of occupation makes little difference to the housework coefficients, suggesting that compensating differentials or differences in effort, at least at the occupational level, cannot entirely explain the negative housework effect. It is possible however that we may be understating the importance of (long-term) job selection, as fixed effects are likely to absorb the impact of long-term career paths or labour market orientation. This could explain the smaller impact of occupation that we find compared to previous cross-sectional studies: Bonke et al. (2005) and Hersch (2009) finds declines of up to a fifth in the housework coefficients when occupation is added 10 . To investigate differences in the housework effect across occupations, we also include full-interactions of the occupation dummies with the housework variables Notes: (i) Controls are reported in Table 2 and notes; (ii) the dependent variable is the log of the real gross hourly wage; (iii) t-statistics in parentheses; (iv) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (as well as including occupation main effects as above). The lower panel of Table 5 reports the coefficients on the interactions. For clarity the equations were parameterized so that the coefficients refer directly to full and part-time workers in the different occupations (i.e. there is no need to add the part-time interaction). Several coefficients are individually significant, but tests show that they are not statistically different across occupations for full-time workers (although the test for married women only just fails to achieve significance at 5%). Thus like Hersch (2009), we find that the negative housework effect appears to span occupations with very different working conditions and job requirements, which is neither consistent with the effort hypothesis nor with the compensating differential hypothesis. For instance, married (full-time) women incur a housework penalty in both nonmanual occupations (ranging from clerical work to management) and manual occupations (operatives and unskilled workers). Whereas housework seems to have a uniform effect on full-time wages across occupations, part-time work appears to be more compatible with housework in some occupations than others. Focussing on women, we reject joint equality across occupations and we see that for single women there is a strong negative effect of housework on the wages of part-timers in sales and unskilled jobs, which cover a third of all single part-time women (Table 3 ). As seen above single part-timers are more likely to be in sales than married part-timers, and so our estimates are consistent with the idea that these part-time jobs may involve inconvenient hours that married workers manage to avoid. For married women working part-time, the only individually significant coefficient is for professional workers and indicates that housework raises wages. However, only 6% of married part-time women are professionals, and there is no evidence of a housework penalty at all in the other occupations.
Some workers have flexitime arrangements under which they can adjust their daily start and finish times provided that they work a set number of hours per week (or month). Flexible jobs may be more compatible with housework, especially if key housework activities need to be done at the margins of the working day and may otherwise interfere with market work. As before, we first see whether the housework effect can be explained by a compensating differential for flexible work by including flexitime as a control in the regressions, and then investigate any differential housework effect within flexible jobs. We use a measure of flexitime which has been collected in the BHPS since wave 9 (thus we estimate using the sample from wave 9 only).
11 The top panel of Table 6 shows that there is still a negative association between housework and wages after controlling for flexitime (although the estimates are less significant than previously, and the part-time interaction is not significant, probably because of the smaller sample size). The flexitime coefficient is not significant, providing no support for a compensating differential explanation. The lower panel of Table 6 adds interactions of flexitime (and non-flexitime) with housework to see whether workers suffer less of a housework penalty in flexible jobs (as above we report coefficients that refer directly to full and part-time workers). For full-time workers, only the non-flexitime housework coefficient is significant at 5% (for married men and women), but tests show that it is not statistically different from the housework coefficient in flexible jobs. For part-time workers, only the non-flexitime housework coefficient for single women approaches significance (at 20%). However, we can reject equality with the housework effect in flexible jobs (p=0.018), so there is perhaps some tentative evidence that flexibility matters for single women working part-time. Overall though, we find little evidence that the need for flexibility in housework can explain its negative effect on wages.
The role of children
The arrival of children, as well as marriage, contributes to increases in housework, especially for women. For example, Hersch and Stratton (1997) find that in the United States the presence of children adds about five hours more of routine housework for women. More recently Craig and Bittman (2008) analyse time-use diaries for Australian men and women and find a positive relationship between housework and the number and ages of children in the household, with women disproportionably sharing the bulk of unpaid work (both housework and childcare) following the birth of the first child. Looking at our sample, we find that women with children devote about 17 hours to housework, six hours more than women with no children who do about 11 hours per week. Consistent with Bittman and Craig's finding, the housework difference between men with and without children is smaller. Men with children do about five hours of housework per week, about half an hour of housework more per week than men without children. Table 7 reports the same specification as in Table 2 but we present separate estimates for households with and without children. The results show that the presence of children increases the housework wage penalty, independently of marital status and part-time status, although the differences only approach statistical significance for married women (p = 0.054). For full-time workers an extra hour of housework lowers a full-time married woman's wage by 0.33% and a full-time married man's by 0.21% if there are children present in the household, as opposed to 0.12% and 0.15% respectively if there are no children present in the home. For singles working full-time results are qualitatively the same, although the coefficients are less significant. For those individuals working part-time the same conclusion follows: the effect of housework is greater if there are children present in the home. These results are in line with those found in Keith and Malone (2005) , who use the PSID to show that housework has a negative effect for childbearing-age married women. In turn, the findings seem to suggest that the housework effect is stronger when combined with childcare, at least for married women working full time. Two related articles, Sullivan (1997) and Bittman and Wajcman (2000) , document that women in employment with children are more likely to be engaged in more intense domestic work, doing several housework activities at a time (such as childcare accompanied by cooking and cleaning tasks). They also have more interrupted leisure than men, and childcare and housework tasks such as cleaning, cooking, and mending clothes are much more likely to interrupt leisure time for this group of women.
Our results may thus reflect that housework is more tiring if it adds to or is done simultaneously with an already large burden of childcare. It could also be that there is a greater effort associated with those housework tasks that are complementary to childcare (such as cleaning and cooking), especially if it is not followed by uninterrupted periods of leisure. Both may result in less effort for other activities such as paid work. It is also possible that childcare responsibilities, which cannot be postponed until more convenient times, may impose timing constraints on when housework can be done, affecting job availability and wages.
Further discussion and robustness checks
Addressing simultaneity and measurement error issues
While the FE model controls for permanent unobserved heterogeneity, it does not allow for any correlation between housework and the transitory error, " it . Such a correlation could arise if housework and wages are determined simultaneously (for example if individuals whose wages increase substitute own housework for market services), or if housework is measured with error.
12 This endogeneity can in principle be dealt with using instrumental variables (IV) methods. Of the few studies that have applied IV methods, Stratton (1997, 2002) conclude that housework is exogenous and therefore IV estimation is not necessary. Furthermore it is difficult to find valid instruments (affecting housework but not wages) in typical survey data (Noonan, 2001 ). Nevertheless we experiment with fixed effect IV methods, using a set of spousal and household characteristics (spouse's labour market participation, hours of work, occupation and wage, and the total number of employed household members). The identifying assumption is that changes in the Hersch and Stratton (1997) suggest that a significant part of the observed variation in housework over time for men represents measurement error. Assuming that g is negative (and that other variables are measured correctly), measurement error will induce a positive correlation between " it and measured housework and thus result in a positive bias. labour market behaviour of the spouse and other household members affect an individual's own housework but are unrelated to any shock to their own wages. The estimates are necessarily restricted to the married samples.
The results shown in Table 8 are mixed. The instruments only appear valid in the equation for married men (in particular they fail the Sargan overidentification test in the married women's equation). The main housework coefficient in the married men's equation is large, negative and statistically significant (À0.019 compared to À0.0019 in the FE equation). However, a joint Hausman test of FE IV against FE does not reject exogeneity, implying that the FE specification is valid. Like Stratton (1997, 2002) , our overall conclusion is that housework is exogenous (in the FE specification) and our preferred estimates are therefore from the FE model.
Alternative housework measure
A practical issue which could create problems of temporal ordering is that the housework question may pick up changes which occurred after the wage changed. Whether this happens will depend on the timing of wage setting (not known from the data); for example if wages are only adjusted annually, the measured wage may refer to a level that was set several months before the interview. To examine the sensitivity of the results to this issue, we re-estimate the basic FE model using the . As is shown in the upper panel of Table 9 , we broadly observe a similar pattern of coefficients to the main results in Table 2 . The main exceptions are that the part-time interaction coefficient is now positive for single women (though not significant at 5%), and we do not find significant effects of housework on married men's wages. One explanation for this difference could be that there is more measurement error in men's housework over time, so that lagged housework is a weaker predictor of the current wage for men than for women. Analysis shows that men's housework is less serially correlated than women's (the serial correlation coefficient is 0.64 for married women and 0.53 for married men), which could reflect measurement error; or men may have more discretion in the amount of housework they do, resulting in greater changes from year to year. Unfortunately the data do not allow us to distinguish between these (or other) possibilities.
Controlling for actual experience
As noted above, we are able to construct a measure of actual labour market experience using the BHPS retrospective data, although about 30% of the sample do not give full information on their work histories. The lower panel of Table 9 presents the estimates when we control for experience and its square (with a dummy to indicate missing experience) instead of age. The results are very close Notes: (i) Controls are reported in Table 2 and notes; (ii) the dependent variable is the log of the real gross hourly wage; (iii) t-statistics in parentheses; (iv) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
to the main estimates that control for age, especially among married men and women. We might have expected the results for women to differ somewhat given that age and experience typically diverge due to career breaks or low labour market attachment. Our results indicate that age may be a good proxy for experience in the fixed-effects model where differences in the long-term labour market orientation of individuals are absorbed by the fixed effect.
Conclusion
This paper has provided the first estimates of the housework-wage relationship in Britain. Using longitudinal data to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we find a negative effect of housework on the wages of full-time workers that spans gender and marital status. In line with studies from other countries the estimated effect is larger for (married) women than for men, although statistically we cannot reject equality. Among part-time workers, we find a negative effect of housework on the wages of single women (and the few men working part-time) of about the same size as for full-timers, however there is no evidence of a housework penalty among married women working part-time.
The similarity of the housework penalty across sub-groups which are characterized by different types and timing of housework could be an indication that the amount of housework matters more than the type or timing; and indeed we find no reduction of the housework penalty in flexible jobs. On the other hand, the housework penalty is also fairly uniform across full-time jobs with widely differing effort requirements, suggesting the housework penalty does not reflect an effort trade-off either. A possible explanation is that interaction of market and housework timing does matter but that there is not enough variation in the timing of full-time work for us to detect the effects. Thus it could be significant that we do detect occupational differences in the housework-wage relation among single part-timers, with stronger effects in jobs that may involve inconvenient hours. It is also interesting that the smallest penalty is among those doing the most housework (married women working part-time). It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these pieces of evidence without direct information on housework and job timing, but one possibility is that married women working part-time may be able to avoid jobs with undesirable schedules; possibly because the presence of a second earner in the household means that they are less constrained in the type of job they can take.
Our findings point to the need for longitudinal data with richer information on time use in order to further explore the mechanisms behind the housework-wage relation. Future research should in particular look at the timing of housework relative to market work. The interaction between housework and part-time jobs could prove informative here since there is likely to be more variation in the timing of part-time work than full-time work. Future work should also probe the tentative finding that children introduce domestic constraints that increase the housework penalty. Again, direct timing information in a panel context would be invaluable. Notes: Flexitime measure is only available from wave 9 (sample of 11840 obs for men and 11859 obs for women).
